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ABSTRACT 
The United States (U.S.) has a longstanding history of providing foreign assistance and 
public health for varying political, economic, and humanitarian reasons.  Each set of imperatives 
has led to its own individual intervention strategies reflecting the discreet goals of its own 
agenda. These interventions have resulted in parallel delivery systems whose distinct and 
independent operations have certainly provided some therapeutic and supportive services while 
they have also neglected other basic needs important to the overall health of recipient 
populations. The Obama Administration‘s Global Health Initiative (GHI) builds upon the 
previous successes of global health strategies but takes a more comprehensive approach by 
establishing a representative leadership group tasked with aligning all governmental global 
health activities with federal policy objectives by consolidating the various departmental, 
agency, and initiative processes. My research question asks why such a leadership group was not 
established earlier, and the purpose of this study is to determine whether by avoiding doing so, 
political leaders enjoyed greater freedom to pursue individual agendas and were able more 
flexibly to respond to emerging global health needs.  My data are from my examination of 
publicly available documents, interviews of elite stakeholders, and a systematic review of 
previous interagency committees.  I analyzed these data using a theoretical framework drawing 
from advocacy coalitions and institutional veto points. I conclude that, while executive and 
legislative decision makers may have greater policymaking latitude in the absence of a 
coordinating interagency committee, it is unlikely that these freedoms are responsible for 
delaying the establishment of a body like the GHI leadership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The US has a longstanding historical precedent of global health policy with roots in both 
foreign assistance and public health. As our understanding of health determinants has developed 
and new health challenges have arose, American global health policy has adapted to address 
these issues. However, federal programs are not the only interventions at work; as public 
awareness of global health issues increases, so does the number and variety of participating 
organizations, and today‘s complex topography of aid organizations consists of non-profit, non-
governmental, private, public, bilateral, multilateral, and international actors. Even within federal 
programs resides a diverse group of agencies and institutes with discreet agendas, priorities, and 
duties that may or may not overlap, coordinate with, or operate independently of each other. 
While each of these activities may accomplish some or all of their aims, the diversity has 
resulted in a lack of integration across programs and areas, overlapping bureaucracies, conflicts 
over responsibilities, and confusion among aid recipients. The relatively narrow and focused 
initiatives that largely represent the recent growth in U.S. global health assistance have also 
resulted in aid distribution profiles that reflect politically appealing subjects instead of recipient 
countries‘ needs (Atwood 2008). 
In 1997 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a report advocating for a continued 
and expanded U.S. role in global health, and among its recommendations was to develop a more 
coherent national strategy for US involvement in global health. The report acknowledged that the 
American role in global health is too complex to be contained by any one agency, since the 
determinants of health include economic, political, and environmental variables (Figure 1), but it 
argued for establishing an inter-agency task force to develop and coordinate a coherent, effective 
approach. It specifically suggested this task force be developed under the Department of Health 
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and Human Services (DHHS), but regardless of the particulars, the general expectation was that 
this task force would be responsible for coordinating a global health strategy, setting priorities 
across participating agencies, and acting as a liaison to other, non-federal actors (IOM 1997, 62). 
During the subsequent Bush Administration the government‘s overall foreign assistance 
institutional architecture was changed in 2006 by determining allocations to the U.S. Agency for 
International Development‘s (USAID) through a Department of State budget process and 
creating an administrative role with two responsibilities, director of foreign assistance at the 
Department of State and head of USAID (Atwood 2008). Although these changes had 
implications for global health activities, they were performed with the goal of elevating 
development assistance to the status of the other foreign relations strategies, defense and 
diplomacy, and other major contributors to global health activities outside of these two 
departments were not formally incorporated into this process. In addition, not only was the 
integration of global health activities a peripheral aspect of these changes, but according to an 
evaluation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) three years later, these changes still 
faced significant organizational, leadership, and coordination challenges to achieving foreign 
assistance reform (GAO 2009). 
Eleven years after its initial report the IOM again assessed the status of U.S. global health 
policy, and during the interim period much progress had been made in developing a more robust 
commitment to global health. On the international stage, the Member States of the United 
Nations had adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reduce poverty and 
improve health outcomes, which helped rekindle international investments in global health. The 
U.S. increased its investment in most areas of global health, especially for HIV; the President‘s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) still represents the largest commitment ever by any 
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nation dedicated to a single disease and tripled the number of HIV-infected people receiving 
antiretroviral treatment sub-Saharan Africa. In the private sector, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, now the world‘s largest charitable organization, has donated $3 billion to global 
health (IOM  2009). 
Despite these advances in global health policy, the IOM still found a lack of oversight 
and coordination among the blooming global health activities sponsored by the federal 
government. During the development of its report the IOM was unable effectively to assess the 
total U.S. commitment to global health and the extent to which its programs had improved global 
health because a system to coordinate and quantify the efforts of more than twenty US agencies 
engaged in international aid was not in place. Tracking the funding produced only limited 
information, and this could not be extended to assess progress or determine whether results 
justified investments. In addition to recommending building upon existing programs and 
emphasizing new health priorities, the IOM again advised establishing an interagency committee 
to formalize the cooperation and coordination between agencies, but this time it proposed 
locating the group in much closer proximity to the  White House (IOM  2009). 
While the IOM was finalizing its report, as if on cue President Barack Obama released a 
statement announcing a new Global Health Initiative for U.S. global health policy, which 
promised ―a more integrated approach to fighting diseases, improving health, and strengthening 
health systems‖ (Office of the Press Secretary and White House 2009, paragraph 5). As more 
specific details emerged, one of the dominating themes became a comprehensive, whole-of-
government approach to global health, one that formally established an interagency operations 
committee, a strategic council composed of representatives of key governmental participants in 
global health, and an executive director to coordinate goal achievement (U.S. Global Health 
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Initiative and U.S. State Department). Whether this strategy is effective remains to be seen, but 
its adoption finally represents an acknowledgement of the need for improved coordination and 
planning in order to meet the health needs of global populations receiving aid from a myriad of 
sources. 
But why was this strategy not adopted earlier? What stimulated it to be implemented 
now? Although significant logistical issues may impede the development of a coordinating inter-
agency group, the prevailing impetus for maintaining the status quo may have been the flexibility 
and freedom it allowed political leaders to pursue individual global health agendas and adapt to 
the most salient issues of their times without having to hew to a single overarching policy 
framework. My intent is to explore whether this seemed to be the case in global health by 
analyzing data from three sources using a combination of two different theoretical policy 
frameworks, that of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988) and veto points (Immergut 1990). Both 
frameworks have appealing qualities as sources of explanation for the GHI leadership, whose 
representation involves multiple constituencies and function has a decision-making role, and they 
are outlined below. 
The implementation of the GHI‘s policy goals is being led by an executive director 
positioned within the Department of State and an operations committee consisting of the USAID 
Administrator, the Director of the CDC, and the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. The ―whole-of-
government‖ approach is being addressed by the formation of a strategic council of 
representatives from a broader set of agencies with expertise in global health, including the 
DHHS, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 
and others. For simplicity I will refer collectively to these overseeing groups as the GHI 
leadership, and the framework of GHI leadership is a structural change in the international health 
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policy making process, one that affects the decision making abilities of the political system in 
this arena. 
Historically decision making associated with global health policy was negotiated in the 
executive and legislative arenas, whose powers permitted a great deal of influence over the 
extent and priorities of global health activities. With the creation of a leadership group that 
formally oversees the collective activities of each contributing participant, the decision making 
arena may shift to a group of stakeholder representatives functioning within a more structured 
framework. While the executive and legislative arenas may continue to have some influence in 
determining which global health domains are addressed, I believe that in achieving its objective 
to coordinate all global health activities the presence of the GHI leadership will temper these 
external priorities and redistribute them to maintain a more balanced aid profile. This may 
introduce the potential for policy developed in the executive and legislative arenas to be 
modified or overridden by the GHI leadership, not by outright denial but through 
implementation. 
This structural change and the diversity of actors involved lend themselves to 
interpretation by the advocacy coalition framework (ACF; first propounded by Sabatier in 1988). 
Governmental departments, agencies, private organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
and bilateral and multilateral agreements all comprise the policy subsystems in global health. 
The formation of an interagency task force is an environmental change within which the policy 
subsystems operate, and although its introduction occurred quite rapidly, its institutional nature 
categorizes the task force as a stable condition within the ACF. 
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An interesting extension of the ACF is how this structural change will affect the 
advocacy coalitions within the policy subsystem and their interactions with each other. Ideally, 
the inter-agency task force would provide the opportunity for all the dimensions of global health 
to be explicitly represented for the purpose of developing a more cohesive national strategy. This 
shift in relative attention among the various advocacy coalitions may have important 
repercussions in their alliances and formation as previously underrepresented actors gain new 
attention and more prominent actors cede some of their influence. The status of policy brokers 
may change as well, as new agents find themselves negotiating between new coalitions and 
develop different lines of communication.   
Advocacy coalition framework 
 Many models have been formulated to explain the policy process. Dissatisfaction with 
the constraints of an institutionally driven stages model, which depicts a linear progression 
through issue emergence, agenda setting, implementation, evaluation, and feedback, led to the 
development of more comprehensive and, especially, more complex models of policy 
development. Among these are John Kingdon‘s streams metaphor and Frank Baumgartner‘s and 
Bryan Jones‘s punctuated equilibrium, and while each model has its merits, no singular model is 
so universally applicable that it best explains every policy making situation (Birkland 2001). I 
find Paul Sabatier‘s advocacy coalition framework (ACF) can be used to map  the political 
actors, public opinion, and environmental conditions that influenced the development of the 
Global Health Initiative. 
 The ACF operates under three basic premises: prolonged timeframe, policy subsystems, 
and the realization of values. Sabatier argues that a wider temporal perspective is needed to 
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understand the process of policy change, because evaluating timespans in units of decades (rather 
than years) allows enough time for the full effects of a completed policy process cycle to be seen. 
He also introduces the notion of policy subsystems, which broadens the scope of potential 
political actors to include not only administrative agencies, legislative committees, and interest 
groups, but also journalists, researchers, and analysts. The premise of realization of values stems 
from Sabatier‘s likening of the public policy process to belief systems, such that policies 
incorporate values and worldviews that implicitly influence their development and achievement 
(Sabatier 1988, 129). 
Within the policy subsystem premise, Sabatier organizes political actors into larger 
coalitions that align overarching individual participants‘ values to address particular policies. 
Sabatier refers to groups who share a particular belief system as advocacy coalitions. The 
advocacy coalition concept is advantageous because it simplifies the process of tracking the 
changing relationships of individual actors and accounts for political actors previously 
overlooked by institutional models. Because they are based upon shared value systems, advocacy 
coalitions tend to be relatively stable over time, and only a few coalitions typically exist for a 
given policy. Also within the policy subsystem are those who facilitate negotiations between 
advocacy coalitions, agents Sabatier terms policy brokers (Sabatier 1988, 129). Using informal 
communication, formal coalitions, and political parties, brokers mediate compromises between 
advocacy coalitions that ultimately lead to policy decisions (Heaney 2006, 887-944). 
In addition, Sabatier acknowledges the importance of the environmental conditions 
within which the activities of policy subsystems take place. These conditions may be categorized 
as either relatively static or dynamic parameters. Stable conditions are those that are not easily 
altered, may set the limits on feasible policy changes, or affect the resources or beliefs of policy 
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subsystem participants. For example, fundamental cultural values, natural resources, and legal 
structures may all be considered static environmental parameters. Dynamic conditions may vary 
within a much shorter time span and swiftly affect policy change, such as socioeconomic 
conditions and policy decisions exogenous to the given system. Both static and dynamic 
parameters establish the setting and outline the resources available for the interactions between 
and among policy subsystems (Sabatier 1988, 129) (Figure 2). 
Institutions, veto points, and policy results 
 As I conceptualize the emergence of the GHI leadership, though, I find the advocacy 
coalition framework does not adequately address the magnitude of the structural change to global 
health policy it represents, and the subsequent  influence this change in institutional structure is 
likely to have on the behavior of its participants and the policy they make. These concepts derive 
from Ellen Immergut‘s analysis of why the establishment of national health insurance took 
different forms in various western European nations despite the common presence of strong 
professional opposition from physician advocacy groups. She uses the national health insurance 
models of France, Sweden, and Switzerland to demonstrate how their differing political systems 
dictated the vetoing behavior of opposing physicians, the successes and limitations of this 
behavior, and the policy results of the conditions surrounding these different ―veto points‖ 
(Immergut 1990, 391-416). 
 In her analysis she points out that national political institutions are designed to discourage 
―extreme factions from introducing radical policy changes‖ (Immergut 1990, 395). For example, 
the U.S. government is divided into three branches each of which has the ability to check the 
others‘ power in order to maintain a balance. Furthermore the legislative branch, which is 
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primarily responsible for introducing new policy, is divided into two chambers with an upper 
house that can ―exert a moderating influence by vetoing proposals from the lower house‖ 
(Immergut 1990, 395), and, finally, within each house is a bipartisan distribution of 
representatives. The result is a stable political institution that is resistant to change through 
various formal and informal institutional mechanisms containing certain ―veto points‖ where 
political decisions require agreement. The number and location of opportunities for these veto 
points may vary depending upon the particular political institution, but within any given 
institution they remain stable (Figure 3). 
 Using Immergut‘s examples, when Sweden‘s Social Democratic executive introduced 
legislation for national health insurance, he enjoyed electoral majorities in both legislative 
chambers, and since executive decisions were unlikely to be vetoed, decision making authority 
was retained by the executive with little potential for outside influence by dissenting physician 
interest groups. Meanwhile in France the executive government did not have a stable electoral 
majority, which allowed legislative representatives greater opportunity to modify or override 
executive decisions, and made the legislative arena a critical decision point in which interest 
groups could participate. The political institution in Switzerland allows referendum campaigns to 
form in opposition to policy decisions agreed upon by both the executive and legislative 
branches, providing an opportunity for opposing interest groups to bring the issue into the 
electoral arena (Immergut 1990, 391-416). 
 Thus for Immergut, formal constitutional rules create a framework for policy making, and 
each political institution‘s  veto points are distinct within that institution. The behavior of the 
participants in policy making may be predicted by the number and location of these veto points, 
because the actors have learned when and at which points they have the most influence. Interest 
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group power is therefore not merely a function of its membership or resources, and political 
institutions are not randomly under the whimsical influence of interest groups. Because veto 
opportunities may explain both interest group influence and the effects of institutions on policy 
results, no singular interest group is successful at imposing its influence because of any inherent 
qualities; rather all interest groups may be expected to behave similarly. Most attempt to shift the 
arena of decision making to one with a political distribution in their favor, resulting in 
predictable behavior (Immergut 1990, 391-416).  
METHODS 
 My analysis is based upon data collected from three different sources: bills that became 
public law, legislative hearing and committee records, and elite stakeholder interviews. In order 
to analyze the contributions and perspectives of the participants involved in U.S. global health 
policy, I traced the development of several pieces of legislation that were successfully enrolled 
by Congress within the time window spanning the two IOM reports, from 1997 to 2008. I chose 
to focus solely on legislation that was enacted because it allows a more structured analysis, 
comparing particular policy pieces‘ intentions and their outcomes, and I limited the time window 
in an attempt to characterize the more recent developments in U.S. global health policy with 
potential relevance to the IOM‘s recognition of a more coordinated national approach. With 
these parameters in mind I searched the Library of Congress‘s records using its THOMAS search 
engine (http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php) for bills from both the House and Senate 
containing the term ―global health‖ across the 105th-110th Congresses, which covered the years 
1997-2008, and I restricted the search to include only bills enrolled and sent to the President . 
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 I then reviewed all bills containing exact matches using this search strategy to confirm 
their relevance to global health, after which I examined relevant bills for documentation of their 
development. Most enrolled bills contain congressional reports from either chamber that 
document general characteristics of the bill, such as the purpose of the legislation, background 
and need, a summary of the bill, a Congressional Budget Office estimate of the cost of 
implementing the policies mandated by the bill, considerations of the congressional committee to 
which the bill was referred, and any hearings that occurred. Since my goal was to gather 
evidence of the use of executive authority in lieu of a more coordinated approach, I was most 
interested in any discussion surrounding the development of each bill and focused on finding 
their associated hearings. According to the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 
A hearing is a meeting or session of a Senate, House, joint, or special committee of 
Congress, usually open to the public, to obtain information and opinions on proposed 
legislation, conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government 
department or the implementation of a Federal law. In addition, hearings may also be 
purely exploratory in nature, providing testimony and data about topics of current interest 
(GPO, paragraph 1). 
 The GPO‘s Federal Digital System (FDsys) is a free, online database that provides access 
to official federal government publications and contains select House and Senate hearings for the 
104th Congress forward, but since the dissemination of a hearing onto this database is up to the 
discretion of its committee, not all hearings are available. Therefore, for bills for which hearings 
are unavailable via the GPO FDsys, I used their congressional records as primary sources, which 
are the official records of the proceedings and debates surrounding a bill and are also available 
through THOMAS. 
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These two sources of documentation, hearings and congressional records, likely would 
provide evidence of the exercise of executive authority and also its repercussions, to a certain 
extent, but they were unlikely to sufficiently address the specific issue of introducing a new 
coordinating body into the American policymaking system. To address this larger question, I 
also performed in-depth interviews of elite stakeholders involved with U.S. global health policy. 
I identified potential respondents through background reading and preparatory work for this 
study, and they included members of the 1997 IOM Board of International Health; the 2008 IOM 
Board of Global Health; GHI Operations Committee on Global Health; GHI Operations 
Committee members and deputies; 105th Congress‘s House Committee on Appropriations and 
Senate Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs; 
and 111th Congress‘s House Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
and Senate Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 
Programs. 
 I coded the hearings, congressional records, and interview transcripts for the actors who 
influenced U.S. global health policy priorities, the barriers they faced when enacting their 
priorities, methods used to navigate those barriers, the coalitions involved in policy making, the 
balance between pursuing political agendas and responding to emerging global health needs, 
accountability, and the awareness and effects of path dependence. In addition the elite 
stakeholder interview transcripts were also coded for how the introduction of a coordinating 
body like the GHI‘s operations committee and strategic council might alter each of these 
constructs. These constructs were conceptualized under the hypothesis that the status quo of 
operating without a coordinating global health policy making body allowed greater flexibility in 
the pursuit of individual political agendas and responding to emerging health needs, and I felt 
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these elements best characterized a framework for how such a body would alter the policy 
making process. Summaries of the coding schema for each data source are provided in the 
appendices. 
 As a causal process tracing, the evidence gathered in this way was not analyzed in the 
traditional sense of regressions because the data were not considered to be ―data-set 
observations‖ (Mahoney 2010, 124). As described by the sentinel work of King, Keohane, and 
Verba, causal process tracing attempts to overcome the limitations associated with small-N 
qualitative studies, such as those utilizing elite interviews, by expanding the observations of the 
intervening causal steps in a pathway. However, this viewpoint usually leads to a degenerative 
process, because an infinite number of steps may be identified, and makes determining which of 
the mechanisms are truly linked to the exposure and outcome difficult. Instead, my process 
tracing utilizes ―causal process observations‖ (Mahoney 2010, 124), which provide information 
about a context, process, or mechanism, and represent in-depth knowledge of particular cases 
and are distinct from data-set observations. These causal process observations allow an analysis 
of seemingly non-comparable observations, which, although they would not be suited for a 
standardized data set, can still be useful for causal inference because they focus on ―sequential 
processes within a particular historical case, not on correlations of data across cases‖ (Mahoney 
2010, 125). 
RESULTS 
 The original search in THOMAS for enrolled bills in the time window yielded eight bills, 
only three of which were confirmed primarily to involve global health issues, House Resolution 
(H.R.) 1298, H.R 5501, and H.R. 2764. H.R. 1298 is titled the U.S. Leadership Against 
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HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003; H.R. 5501 is the Tom Lantos and Henry J. 
Hyde U.S. Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization 
Act of 2008; and H.R. 2764 is the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Both H.R 5501 and 
H.R. 2764 had congressional hearings associated with them, but only the hearing associated with 
H.R. 2764 is available through the GPO; H.R. 1298 did not have any hearings, but I located and 
coded congressional records for H.R. 1298 and H.R. 5501.  
Of the original eighteen potential interview respondents whom I actively recruited, only 
three were able to be interviewed within the necessary timeframe of this study, and all three were 
participants in either the 1997 or 2008 IOM committees. Although each of these respondents had 
intimate knowledge of  U.S. global health policy in general, the lack of insights from participants 
who hold government positions severely limited the information gleaned on how the GHI and its 
leadership altered the constructs I was investigating. Those who did allow me to interview them 
are Thomas Pickering, Harvey Fineberg, and Harold Varmus. Thomas Pickering has an 
extensive diplomatic career in foreign relations serving as a U.S. ambassador as well as being a 
former Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Department of State, and currently he 
is the vice-chairman of an international consulting group. Both he and Harold Varmus served as 
co-chairs on the 2009 IOM Committee on the U.S. Commitment to Global Health, which 
produced two reports on the U.S. involvement in global health. Dr. Varmus is a Nobel-prize 
winner who has served in several prestigious leadership positions, including the Director of the 
National Institutes of Health and as the current Director of the National Cancer Institute. After an 
extended tenure as Dean of the Harvard School of Public Health and also as a consultant to the 
World Health Organization, Dr. Harvey Fineberg is currently the President of the IOM. 
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 The first construct I investigated was the delegation of power that a coordinating body 
imposes upon its superiors, and the relevant variables I identified were the most influential actors 
involved in prioritizing U.S. global health policy decisions, the barriers actors faced when 
enacting priorities, and the methods available to navigate those barriers. The actors identified by 
respondents included the President and Presidential Administration, Congress, senior staff of 
executive departments and agencies like the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and major philanthropies like the Gates and Bloomberg Foundations. By 
far the most commonly referenced actors identified in the hearings and congressional records 
were the President, the Administration, and certain Members of Congress, as exemplified by this 
language: 
And from my recent conversations with the President, I know that he has worked very 
hard on this reauthorization, and it is with the support of the White House and the staff, 
they helped us craft this bipartisan legislation‖ (Payne 2008, column 1, paragraph 5). 
The influence of the President was a sentiment echoed by the respondents as well: ―Well, I mean 
I think certainly the President had to make the final decision‖ (Pickering interview, 2011, line 
97).  It is not, of course, surprising that any given president would be a principal actor in any 
foreign policy arena. 
 Most of the discussion involving barriers revolved around funding: how much to 
authorize, when to authorize it, and to whom or which area to appropriate it. Two interview 
respondents also indicated that competing priorities presented a barrier, such as conflicting 
morals or health opinions, but discussion within the congressional records referred to 
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institutional barriers like coordinating bill progression with congressional sessions and the 
bicameral and bipartisan structure of Congress: 
The House of Representatives had ample opportunity to act on this bill before Congress 
adjourned last November, but it failed to even take it up. Nor was the House interested in 
conferencing the full bill. The administration provided no impetus, no leadership, and no 
effort in order to try to get the House to do so (Kerry 2003, column 3, paragraph 5). 
 Corresponding to the emphasis on funding as a barrier, much of the navigation methods 
were related to providing money to support programs. Two respondents suggested that positional 
authority allowed enough freedom to overcome barriers like funding or opposing priorities, 
either in the form of the President, who ―is not a lower-level functionary, he‘s the President, and 
people tend to listen to what the President asks for‖ (Varmus interview, 2011, line 121), or as an 
organizing task force ―at sufficiently high level to make departmental decisions‖ (Pickering 
interview, 2011, line 122). Other avenues identified in the hearing and congressional records 
were compromising on priorities, ―The President [Bush] himself has seen the wisdom of this 
approach [abstain, be faithful, and use condoms instead of emphasizing abstinence to address 
HIV] and supports it‖ (Christensen 2003, column 3, paragraph 6), and devoting multiple 
appropriations bills to a single cause, 
In order to provide adequate financial and human resources to complete the goals of 
PEPFAR as well as maintain U.S. leadership in the Global Fund, the President has spread 
the request for HIV/AIDS-related resources across the two appropriations bills (Foreign 
Operations and Labor-Health and Human Services) (U.S. Senate 2008, page 193, 
paragraph 6). 
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 The second construct I explored was the reconciliation of attitudes that a coordinating 
body might engender, and the variables I identified were the inputs influencing policy makers 
priorities, which I divided into either political agendas or responding to emerging global health 
needs, and how any coalitions involved affected policy choices. Interview respondents‘ views on 
the balance between the contributions of political agendas and emerging health needs on policy 
choices were equivocal; while they did not favor either category, they did acknowledge the 
importance of both to policy choices: 
I think that most of these issues one way or another are a blend of both realities that come 
up, some of them new and some of them continuing, and the advocates for the treatment 
for dealing with those problems, and it‘s very difficult to say which may be higher or 
lower (Pickering interview, 2011, line 172). 
 The testimonies of hearing witnesses and debates in the congressional records strongly 
favor the pursuit of political agendas. While an emerging health need like the rising incidence 
and prevalence of HIV/AIDS worldwide prompted the pursuit of a global HIV/AIDS policy, the 
choices made in shaping the policy and subsequent policies were influenced by political agendas 
rather than a needs reassessment. Comments ranged in the degree of conviction but generally fell 
between ―Nearly all programs are heavily ear-marked, with little or no monies designated for 
general health threats or health systems management and support‖ (U.S. Senate 2008, page 64, 
paragraph 6) and ―My own view is that the less Congress injects itself into matters of global 
health the better, because the result is too often that politics and ideology take precedence over 
what is in the best interest of public health in a particular country‖ (Leahy 2008, column 2, 
paragraph 6). 
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 Important coalitions identified by respondents included advocates for HIV/AIDS, 
maternal health, and the growing influence of philanthropies, and coalition references in the 
congressional records were sparse, but referenced unspecified advocacy groups, non-
governmental organizations, and faith-based groups. The Congressional Black Caucus was also 
referenced as a significant influence to President Bush‘s resumption of a global HIV/AIDS 
policy after the 107th Congress failed to pass a bill on it before its term ended in 2002. None of 
the respondents were able to comment on how the GHI or its leadership organization might 
change the relationship advocacy coalitions have with the policy making process. 
 The final construct I examined was accountability and how an organizing body might 
alter the feedback and repercussions U.S. global health policy results have on its decision 
makers. The variables I identified included whether policy makers feel accountable, who is best 
at holding them accountable, whether policy makers are cognizant of path dependence in policy 
making, and how path dependence affects policy makers‘ choices. For the purposes of this study 
path dependence refers to the concept that past policy decisions influence the context in which 
future decisions are made. Respondents had conflicting views on whether policy makers feel 
accountable. Thomas Pickering noted that ―a lot of government policy making lacks a very 
significant structure for accountability, the use of metrics to determine the effects of results and 
the way in which inputs are handled‖ (line 202), but he and Harold Varmus both said that elected 
officials ultimately feel accountable to the electorate. In the congressional documents, Senator 
Leahy (D-VT) also questions the sense of responsibility within USAID when he notes: 
For example, in Nigeria, you said you want to help them strengthen their institutions and 
make progress permanent … But if you take out AIDS you only propose an additional 
$20 million for Nigeria, a country of 125 million people. You cut aid to the Ukraine by 
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$16 million, I believe. Georgia by $21 million. How does this show us strengthening their 
institutions? (U.S. Senate 2008, page 11, paragraph 1) 
 Each of the respondents said that policy makers were aware of path dependence but with 
a few caveats; two noted that despite policy makers having an appreciation for what decisions 
had been made in the past, this does not preclude certain individuals with sufficient authority 
from striking out in new directions and pursuing new approaches. Policy makers themselves 
demonstrated an appreciation for path dependence, e.g. Senator Gregg (R-NH): ―When it comes 
to foreign aid reform, what is past is prologue‖ (U.S. Senate 2008, page 3, paragraph 3). Perhaps 
more subtly, policy makers and others both frequently alluded to path dependence when 
referencing the need to amend previously enrolled bills to be expanded and address new issues, 
but always within the context of the initial bill‘s framework. For example, when addressing the 
need to increase USAID‘s maternal and child health, nutrition, and public health programs, 
USAID Assistant Administrator Hill admits, 
But the way it tends to get done is that it is a component within a project that might be 
HIV or malaria or tuberculosis or contraceptive health or whatever it is, and any good 
program is going to have a component to it that specifically deals with this issue (U.S. 
Senate 2008, page 81, paragraph 8). 
DISCUSSION: WILL THE GHI CHANGE THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY MAKING? 
Although not unexpected, one of the most revealing insights of this analysis is the degree 
to which the President, the Presidential Administration, and Congress have an influence over the 
direction U.S. global health policy takes. As actors in the prioritization process those delegated 
with the responsibility of carrying out government policy, such as the senior staff of 
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governmental departments and agencies that now comprise the GHI leadership, have historically 
had little more influence in directing policy than in an advisory role to both the Administration 
and Congress. Their roles seem to have been more administrative than policy-generating in the 
past than I had expected, which diminishes my expectations for their future influence acting as a 
GHI leadership council in its present form. Since much of the initiative for major new policy 
directions originates above the level of the GHI leadership, it may be best suited for distributing 
the resources it is allocated, rather than playing a creative role in redesigning the larger policy 
context within which those resources are meant to effect policy goals. Therefore the introduction 
of the GHI leadership has not resulted in a significant delegation of power. In Immergut‘s 
language the decision making process involving policy prioritization appears to have remained in 
the executive and legislative arenas, but this process does not occur in a linear fashion. As 
Harvey Fineberg suggested when it comes to global health: 
What we actually have is not the product of a strategic assessment followed by 
prioritization followed by action as much as an aggregation and accumulation over time 
of choices made in the face of priorities and understandings at a given moment (line 176). 
Whether the distribution of allocated resources occurs in a more comprehensive fashion 
than it did prior to the inception of the GHI is a matter of path dependence. Even if a GHI 
leadership board exists, its authority is intricately constrained by the primary barriers facing U.S. 
global health policy making:  funding and differing  priorities. The amount of funding devoted to 
U.S. global health policy, as is true of all policy, is largely determined by a negotiation between 
the President‘s annual budget request and what Congress is willing to appropriate, although 
global health policy is more vulnerable than policies in other domains in that it does not 
obviously attract the kinds of powerful, broad, and durable advocacy coalitions from which 
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many domestic policies benefit. Within the advocacy coalition framework the feedback a policy 
subsystem receives from the policy outputs it produces mirrors the concept of path dependence, 
and the involved coalitions may revise their beliefs or strategies based on the adequacy of the 
subsystem‘s output. If the decision making authority over global health had shifted from the 
executive and legislative arenas, the GHI leadership would primarily adapt its activities to the 
outcomes of its own past decisions and not those negotiated between the Administration and 
Congress. However, this is not the case, and although the GHI leadership‘s potential ability to 
speak with one voice, replacing the babble of past global health policy making, may make it 
more influential, its activities will always be limited by the daunting constraints of budget 
negotiations. As Thomas Pickering pointed out, this negotiation is a complicated process because 
budget requests are based upon projections extending two years into the future, and it is difficult 
for all the participants to anticipate the needs of the world‘s health in advance. 
The GHI leadership‘s ability to dictate the distribution of its resources is also challenged 
by the barrier of  reconciling different priorities. Because of its diverse membership of leaders 
representing different, large groups, I envisioned the GHI leadership as a forum where various 
coalitions would be able to negotiate decisions. The potential outputs from this process would be 
bounded by the leadership‘s directive to develop complementary global health programs. This 
would modify or overrule policy decisions made in other arenas like the Administration and 
Congress that may reflect political ideologies instead of recipients‘ needs. Based upon the 
evidence presented here, though, it is unclear whether GHI leadership will alter the balance of 
pursuing political agendas and emerging health needs, because its funding authorizations may 
still be earmarked by those who crafted the bills:  the GHI‘s dialogue with Congress and the 
President will not be an equal one.  And if a unified GHI can articulate a more coherent position 
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to Congress, the GHI leadership still serves at the pleasure of the President. This is best 
exemplified by USAID Administrator Tobias‘s description of his attempt to coordinate USAID 
and the Department of State‘s foreign assistance agenda, which targeted all of its programs 
toward the common goal of transformational diplomacy as defined by the Bush Administration. 
Similarly, it is also unclear whether the GHI leadership will alter the representation of 
coalitions in order to achieve a more balanced global health agenda that better reconciles donor 
aid profiles with recipient needs. Even in the past, the senior staff of the participants in U.S. 
global health activities demonstrated an appreciation for comprehensive programs: 
I think that most people in the field tend to operate not off of pure predispositions or 
whim, but out of a fairly deep knowledge of what kinds of issues are out there and how 
important they are (Pickering interview, 2011, line 175). 
The GHI leadership contains a diverse membership with comprehensive perspectives that should, 
on the face of it, help promote comprehensive policy making, but that in itself may be no match 
for either Presidential or Congressional agendas.  For example, USAID Administrator Tobias 
testified that his new country-by-country needs assessment process resulted in better coordinated 
and more appropriate foreign assistance distribution, but that did not prevent Senator Judd Gregg 
(R-NH) from charging that the process nonetheless merely reflected Presidential preferences:   
Well, it doesn‘t make sense to me that there was a rationale in each case, because it had 
to be a philosophical decision because it‘s so apparent that you have moved away from 
this region of the world [post-Soviet republics] and moved money into another region of 
the world, specifically Africa, it looks like. It was a regional decision; it wasn‘t country-
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by-country, I don‘t think, but certainly the dollars have been flying out (U.S. Senate 
2008, page 13, paragraph 3). 
The literature suggests that interagency committees can, in fact, increase the level of their 
influence over the policy process. As Lambright found in his analysis of the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program‘s Committee on Environment and Natural Resources (CENR), which was an 
interagency committee whose objective is to develop a coordinated national research agenda 
investigating environmental issues, one of the potential strengths of an interagency committee 
may be derived from being legitimized by both the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
and Congress.  In the case of the CENR, Congress provided it with a legislative mandate, and the 
OMB‘s approval of the committee-produced budgets meant agency leaders could not reprogram 
allocations to other areas, an action that Thomas Pickering noted frequently occurs in global 
health. Lambright found that ―this changed power in Washington and allowed the committee to 
assert its priorities on the general interests of agency heads‖ (Lambright 1997, 39), and once 
decisions were made, they remain made (Lambright 1997). 
This study‘s lack of GHI leadership as interview respondents resulted in no evidence of 
how the presence of an institutional structure like the GHI leadership might change how 
advocacy coalitions are able to affect the policy making process, but for all its novelty, the GHI 
leadership must still compete in the extant system and must still respond to presidential and 
congressional preferences. In the advocacy coalition framework, the many participants in policy 
making may be aggregated into relatively few coalitions according to their shared beliefs, and 
the arena in which these coalitions negotiate policy decisions about a particular policy domain is 
called a subsystem. Coalitions employ various strategies to negotiate within these subsystems, 
and originally I thought the presence of the GHI leadership would alter these strategies. Similarly 
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the enduring structure of political institutions allows various interest groups to develop 
predictable patterns of behavior that revolve around the institutions‘ veto points, and I believed 
that in meeting its objective of coordinating global health activities, the GHI leadership would 
serve as a veto point that would modify the policy decisions made in the executive and 
legislative arenas. However, even with the lack of direct evidence, a trend indicated the GHI 
leadership may not alter coalitions‘ strategies as Harvey Fineberg stated, ―I don‘t think any of 
those agendas [advocated by a coalition] have been altered by the creation of a mechanism of 
decision making‖ (line 126). 
Although the ―need for more coherent global health policy‖ does not seem to have been 
particularly visible on the policy agenda, the general, and growing, attraction to notions of 
―accountability‖ may have made the GHI seem especially attractive. Many stakeholders both 
inside and outside government expressed growing displeasure with the lack of measurable, 
salient returns on our global health investment, without coming to agreement on who should 
measure performance.  Republicans frequently expressed their trust in the President‘s ability to 
meet his policy goals, but supported having ―additional clarity on how these funds [U.S. 
contributions to the Global Fund] are being used in the field for those most in need of our 
assistance‖ (Fortenberry 2008, column 2, paragraph 17). Thus while the President may be held 
accountable for narrow, specific policy goals like increasing the number of patients receiving 
anti-retroviral medication, the position seems insulated from being accountable for broader 
global health objectives. 
However, an interagency body like the GHI leadership, whose goals are comprehensive 
improvements in health, would be accountable for significantly more domains in global health. 
In the political institution sense this shift in accountability from the executive arena to that of the 
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GHI leadership would establish a new point where the potential for repercussions and policy 
modifications is increased, similar to a veto point. Only a select few in Congress have wanted a 
larger global health policy framework, and most of them restrict their activities to amending past 
bills to broaden their scope, rather than envisioning an entirely different framework, speaking 
both to path dependence and the strength of incrementalism in the American system. 
Meanwhile, advocates outside government persisted in identifying the need for more 
comprehensive legislation, but given the significant challenges presented by the complicated 
political conditions needed to pass new legislation, this strategy of advocating new policy within 
the subsystem seems to underappreciate the effect of path dependence. Only those policy goals 
that were amendments to previously enrolled legislation were successfully enacted, and while 
these wrap-around health services were limited in scope by their association with HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria policy, they do represent a successful strategy to address broader, more 
comprehensive global health activities. This illustration of how path dependence influences 
political strategies corresponds with the notion that coalitions utilize certain strategies to 
negotiate policy decisions within the advocacy coalition framework, and how the structure of 
political institutions results in consistent behavior of its participants.  
CONCLUSION 
 The U.S. government is an active and generous participant in global health. Even though 
the proportion of the U.S. gross domestic product spent on global health activities is smaller than 
is true of many other nations (Figure 4), the absolute amount spent has made the U.S. one of the 
most significant contributors in the world (Figure 5), and its participation continues to grow. 
However, this growth has occurred unevenly across the various domains of global health, and the 
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previous state of affairs was an aggregate of activities developed piecemeal, in response to both 
political agendas and emerging health needs. Piecemeal, disaggregated policy efforts have 
dismayed those who see the need for comprehensive coordination, generating a call for change 
on the part of the global health policy elite. The current Global Health Initiative, created by the 
Obama Administration, addresses this need for a more coherent strategy using language 
describing a ―whole-of-government approach,‖ which includes the establishment of a 
representative operations committee and strategic council tasked with integrating the services of 
the multitude of governmental departments, agencies, and initiatives. 
Originally I had anticipated that the GHI leadership would alter the policy making 
process in a number of ways that may have discouraged it or a similar coordinating body from 
being established earlier; namely, by delegating authority, providing a forum for reconciling 
attitudes, and improving accountability, all of which might reduce the ability of executive 
decision makers to pursue particular agendas or quickly respond to emerging needs. By 
combining Sabatier and Immergut‘s theories I conceptualized the GHI leadership as an 
institutional decision-making nexus through which several aspects of the policy making process 
would flow. Tasked with the responsibility of coordinating the U.S. government‘s global health 
activities, the GHI leadership would serve as a resistor to policy decisions made upstream that 
may result in the unbalanced pursuit of different global health domains. The diffusion of 
executive authority provided by this checkpoint would be a product of its function as a forum for 
various advocacy coalitions to reconcile their attitudes through more evenly distributed 
representation. With improved coordination, however, would come more potential for 
accountability as the program outcomes resulting from the GHI leadership‘s policy outputs 
would affect the coalitions involved, future decisions, and the leadership‘s credibility. 
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Given what I know after collecting this evidence, it seems I overestimated the potential 
authority of the GHI leadership within the political institution. These findings suggest that the 
GHI leadership is still significantly influenced by policy decisions negotiated in the executive 
and legislative arenas and that its presence is likely not a significant veto point in the decision 
making process. While it has been tasked to better align global health activities with U.S. policy 
goals by consolidating global health processes from the various governmental participants, the 
GHI leadership does not represent an opportunity for various advocacy groups to veto legislation 
within the political institution. The inability to interview GHI leadership is a significant 
limitation of this study but, even without in-depth interviews with GHI committee members, the 
remaining evidence suggests that the executive‘s need to retain hegemonic control over the 
policy agenda was not the reason a similar body was not created sooner for U.S. global health 
policy. 
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FIGURES  
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the U.S. government‘s global health architecture. Adapted from Kates, J. 
―The U.S. Global Health Initiative: Key Issues‖ Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation; 
April 2010. Available at http://kff.org/globalhealth/upload/8063.pdf. Last accessed 6 June 2011. 
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Figure 2. Advocacy coalition framework. From Sabatier, Paul A. 1988. "An Advocacy Coalition 
Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein." Policy 
Sciences, 21 (2):129. 
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Figure 3. Political arenas and veto points. Adapted from Immergut, E.M. 1990. "Institutions, 
Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care." Journal of Public 
Policy, 10 (4):391-416. 
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Figure 4. Net official development assistance in 2007. From OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development). 2008a. Debt relief is down: Other ODA rises slightly: Tables 
and charts. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,3343,en_2649_34447_40381960_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 
14 July 2011). 
* ODA: official development assistance; GNI: gross national income; UN: United Nations; 
DAC: Development Assistance Committee  
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Figure 5. Net official development assistance in 2007, continued. From OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development). 2008a. Debt relief is down: Other ODA rises 
slightly: Tables and charts. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,3343,en_2649_34447_40381960_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 
14 July 2011). 
* ODA: official development assistance; GNI: gross national income; UN: United Nations; 
DAC: Development Assistance Committee  
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APPENDIX 1: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
Approach to reviewing the literature 
 After gaining an appreciation for how the separate, but not entirely dissimilar, 
responsibilities of various government departments and agencies aggregate to form the sum of 
current US global health policy, I realized the potential for program overlap and competing 
interests may not be unique to this policy domain. The need for interagency coordination seemed 
plausible for a number of other domains at all levels of government, including federal, state, and 
local, and I wanted to investigate how previous institutional attempts fared at developing more 
coherent and organized strategies within a specific domain. I performed preliminary background 
searches in multiple databases for policy analyses of institutional bodies similar to the GHI‘s 
operations committee and strategic council using queries containing various combinations of 
terms like interagency coordination, interagency cooperation, policy making, decision making, 
policy results, institution, shared, presidential, executive, power, and duties. However, the results 
were surprisingly sparse and quickly narrowed the potential policy domains down to one, 
environmental science. 
 In 1989 Ronald Reagan submitted his final presidential budget that contained a report 
linking various agency efforts into a new multiagency U.S. Global Change Research Program 
(USGCRP), which outlined a coordinated national research agenda investigating environmental 
issues like ozone depletion, deforestation, and global warming. The program was headed by an 
interagency committee initially called the Committee on Earth Sciences, and although its name 
changed to the Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences and Committee on Environment 
and Natural Resources under the Bush and Clinton administrations, respectively, it continued to 
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serve as a perceived successful example of a functioning interagency management system. This 
committee, which was chaired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), and later included the Department of Energy (DOE), at one point coordinated 
the activities of eighteen governmental departments and agencies (Lambright 1997). 
 Several conditions led to my review of this particular program. First, it existed at the 
federal level of government and was initiated, at least officially, by presidential authority. 
Second, it attempted to coordinate the activities of many different government departments and 
agencies by balancing the research priorities of its members who previously competed for 
funding and resources to accomplish similar goals. Third, although NASA‘s Earth Observation 
System, which was a resource-intensive satellite-development effort, was responsible for a large 
proportion of the budget appropriated to the USGCRP, no single government entity dominated 
the research agenda developed by the interagency committee. Fourth, the successes and 
limitations of this committee illustrate the tensions between congressional, presidential, 
bureaucratic, and academic stakeholders and highlight the role a structural change within the 
environmental science policy domain changes their relationships and policy outcomes. 
Systematic review 
In order to assess the potential for interagency oversight and management to achieve the 
goals and objectives of a policy whose operationalization depends upon the activities of multiple 
agencies, I performed a systematic review of the available policy analyses of the U.S. Global 
Change Research Program and its Committee on Environment and Natural Resources. On 7 June 
2011 I performed a Boolean search in the JSTOR database using the following query: 
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(―Global Change Research Program‖ OR ―Committee on Earth Sciences‖ OR 
―Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences‖ OR ―Committee on Environment and 
Natural Resources‖) AND interagency 
This search yielded 94 results, most of which dealt with specific scientific research inquiries that 
referenced either the USGCRP or its leading committee. Of those whose title or subject matter 
dealt with policy analysis, only four specifically examined the effect of the GCRP and its leading 
committee on the policy making process. None of these empirically tested any hypotheses, but 
the insights and themes derived from them are useful when considering the potential effects of a 
similar interagency body like the GHI‘s executive committee and strategic council on the U.S. 
global health policy making process. 
Lambright, 1997 
 This article outlines the stages of progression common to organizational development 
within an institution, which progress through an awareness of a need for a new coordinating 
mechanism, an event that triggers action toward meeting this need, an institutional birthing stage, 
implementation, evaluation and feedback,  and finally either institutionalization or dissolution. 
Lambright describes the development of the Committee on Environment and Natural Resources 
in this format, and along the way he identifies the conditions surrounding the success and 
limitations of interagency coordination using the committee as an example, including common 
interests, constituency, morale, and leadership. 
 For Lambright the successful formation of the Committee on Environment and Natural 
Resources was dependent upon the alignment of the professional, scientific, and bureaucratic 
interests of its participating members. Its establishment and future maturation also depended 
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upon the external support of multiple constituencies, including the scientific community, 
President, and Congress. Lambright states that interagency work requires high morale from its 
participants because much of the effort it requires is in addition to their regular duties, and 
morale was necessary to maintain the commitment to keep the committee viable. Leadership 
strategies, such as funding, use of rhetoric, ―end run,‖ ―hidden hand,‖ and protecting interests, all 
played a role in the committee‘s development, and each of these conditions influenced the 
committee‘s development during its progression through the organizational stages. Using these 
conditions Lambright frames the developmental path of the Committee on Environment and 
Natural Resources and finds that the successes and limitations of interagency coordination can 
both be explained by them. With a focused initial mandate of scientific research into global 
climate change, the interests of the committee‘s members  
Pielke, 1995 
 This article examines the shortcomings of the Committee on Earth and Environmental 
Sciences (CEES) under the U.S. Global Change Research Program (GCRP) in meeting its legal 
mandate to provide Congress with ‗usable information‘ on which to base policy decisions about 
global climate change. In the process it outlines the political conditions that led to the addition of 
this policy relevant mandate to the GCRP‘s original directive of coordinating the global change 
research agenda, and Pielke attributes the failure of the second iteration of the interagency 
committee to meet this objective to several reasons, including ambiguous definitions, different 
expectations among stakeholders, and poor accountability on both the executive and legislative 
branches‘ behalf. He also places this policy problem within the broader context of U.S. science 
policy structure in which a social contract exists between scientific development and the rest of 
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society, and that the expectation that good science will inevitably lead to good decisions 
abdicated the need for program oversight. 
 In addition to these reasons for failing to meet its legal mandate, Pielke analyzes several 
explanations for the CEES‘s performance that involve the roles of different participants in the 
legislative process and their perspectives, and he uses the failure of the CEES to illustrate how 
scientific research ought to relate to the policy process. He also presents and refutes competing 
explanations for the CEES‘s performance failure, progressively addressing congressional 
fragmentation, administrative pluralism, the effectiveness of the social contract between science 
and policy, and the surrounding politics. Pielke describes how the CEES demonstrates the role of 
accountability in the policy process; a convergence of expectations for program performance, 
congressional oversight, and administrative, congressional, and executive leadership are all 
needed to reduce the gap between policy goals and the actual state of affairs. He states that 
program performance depends upon the attainment of goals, assessing output instead of input, 
and again emphasizes accountability. 
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Article Thesis Themes Conclusions 
Lambright, 
1997 
The evolution of the Committee on 
Environment and Natural Resources 
illustrates the key factors that strengthen 
and weaken interagency cooperation in 
government 
 Common interests 
 Constituency 
 Morale 
 Leadership 
 Common professional and scientific 
interests among committee 
participants and bureaucratic and 
financial incentives were all satisfied 
 Committee had the support of the 
scientific community, the President, 
and Congress 
 Committee participants felt and were 
special with a legislative mandate 
and devoted staff 
 Multiple leadership strategies were 
triangulated to promote the 
committee 
Pielke, 
1995 
Appraises the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program (GCRP) under the 
Committee on Earth and Environmental 
Sciences (CEES) with respect to its legal 
mandate for ‗usable information‘ 
Attributes the CEES 
performance shortfall to: 
 Failures in the 
legislative process 
 Participant 
perspectives 
 The structure of 
modern science 
policy 
 The legislative process broke down 
because the program‘s mandate was 
easily avoided and difficult to 
enforce. 
 Participants in the policy process 
expected the mandate would be 
unenforced and failed to use the law 
as a guide for implementation. 
 The structure of post-war science 
policy helped create an atmosphere 
where participants expected that 
enforcement of the mandate would be 
unnecessary. 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS 
 
Name Title Relationship 
Thomas 
Pickering 
Vice Chairman, Hills & Company, 
International Consultants; formerly, Under-
Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
(Retired) 
Co-Chair, Committee on the U.S. 
Commitment to Global Health, 
Institute of Medicine, 2009 
Harvey 
Fineberg 
President, Institute of Medicine 
Co-Chair, Board on International 
Health, Institute of Medicine, 1997 
Harold 
Varmus 
Director, National Cancer Institute 
Co-Chair, Committee on the U.S. 
Commitment to Global Health, 
Institute of Medicine, 2009 
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APPENDIX 3: PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 
Bill 
number 
Bill title Record type Key participants 
H.R. 
2764 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 Senate hearing 
Daulaire (President, Global Health Council), Garrett (Senior 
Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), Gayle (President, 
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere), Gregg (R-
NH), Hill (Assistant Administrator, USAID), Leahy (D-VT), 
Rice (Secretary of State), Tobias (Administrator, USAID) 
H.R. 
1298 
U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 
(President‘s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief, PEPFAR) 
Congressional 
record 
Biden (D-DE), Boxer (D-CA), Christensen (D-VI), Daschle 
(D-SD), Enzi (R-WY), Frist (R-TN), Hatch (R-UT), Kerry (D-
MA), Lantos (D-CA), Leach (R-IA), Leahy (D-VT), Lugar (R-
IL), Nadler (D-NY), Sessions (R-AL), Slaughter (D-NY), 
Specter (R-PA) 
H.R. 
5501 
Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde U.S. 
Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (PEPFAR 
reauthorization) 
Congressional 
record 
Blumenauer (D-OR), Fortenberry (R-NE), Jackson-Lee (D-
TX), Leahy (D-VT), Lee (D-CA), Payne (D-NJ), Pelosi (D-
CA), Waxman (D-CA), Woolsey (D-CA) 
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APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
1. I have read the academic literature carefully, but I would very much like to have your 
perspective on how particular global health concerns were prioritized by US global health 
policy. Prior to the passage of the GHI, who would you say were the most influential 
actors deciding on which global health areas would be prioritized by US government 
agencies – and by actors, I mean any and all  stakeholders inside or outside government 
whom you think were the most important policy actors in global health policy? 
a. Generally, what barriers do you think were the most common ones policymakers 
faced before they could enact the global health priorities? 
b. How would decision makers navigate these barriers? 
2. What about AFTER creation of the GHI?  In particular, do you think the introduction of 
an operations committee and strategic council has changed who the decision makers are, 
what their relationship is to external influences, and the barriers US global health policy 
making now faces? 
3. I‘m also interested in how the relationships between important coalitions may have 
changed.  I know that many different actors and coalitions can exert influence, depending 
on the particular subject, but prior to the introduction of the GHI, which voices or 
coalitions would you say were USUALLY MOST prominent in shaping the US global 
health agenda? 
a. Has the GHI changed this at all? 
b. What new voices have appeared, or have previously smaller ones been affected? 
c. How might the presence of an operations committee and strategic council affect 
these coalitions? 
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4. From my reading it seems that US global health policy making has been a combination of 
individual agendas and responses to important emerging health needs, and I‘m trying to 
delineate the two. In general, to what extent was the previous US global health policy 
making system tilted by current events or by people‘s ongoing agendas? 
a. What about after the GHI?  Does the presence of an operations committee and 
strategic council change this balance of ongoing agendas and the need to respond 
to current events? 
5. My remaining few questions are concerned about the feedback that decision makers 
obtain from previous policy decisions and how it shapes future behavior. When you are 
thinking about US global health policy generally, how have global health policymakers 
viewed accountability? By that I mean to whom do you think most global health 
policymakers feel accountable? Did that change after the initiation of the GHI? 
a. And who is best at HOLDING the policymakers accountable? Has the GHI 
changed that at all? 
b. My readings have taught me to think of policy as being path dependent – that is, 
that earlier decisions inevitably influence the context in which future decisions 
can be made. Political scientists might think about path dependence, but do you 
think policymakers themselves are thinking about that when they are in the 
middle of the policy development? 
c. If so, how does that constrain the process? Or if not, what things insulate 
policymakers from this sense of future consequences? Can you give me some 
examples? 
 46 
 
d. Again, do you think the creation of the GHI‘s operations committee and strategic 
council will change these dynamics at all?   
6. Last question! Is there anything else you think I should know about how US global health 
policy is made or how the GHI and, in particular, its operations committee and strategic 
council may change it? 
7. Thank you so much for your time and thoughts! Is there anything else you‘d like to say, 
or anything I haven‘t asked that I should have? 
